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The emergence of an independent neutralist Africa 
changed the dynamics of the cold war. The military-
strategic orientation of the United States and Soviet Union 
had little relevance to underdeveloped Africa. Following 
the death of Joseph Stalin, the USSR began to discard the 
ideological impediments which had hampered their relations 
with neutralist Africa, bpt the United States under the 
Eisenhower Administration continued to oppose the neutralist 
doctrine. 
John F. Kennedy came to office determined to bring a 
new dynamism to United States foreign policy towards Africa. 
He declared a new tolerance of neutralism. The decision 
whether to give foreign aid to Kwame Nkrumah's Volta River 
project became a test case for the Kennedy administration's 
new policy toward the neutralist states of Africa. 
The decision to support the project was a concrete 
manifestation of that policy. For Kennedy's purposes, it 
mattered little whether the project failed or succeeded. 
What was important was that the United States was visibly 
competing for the trust of neutralist Africa. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT • • • 




THE COLD WAR, AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE 
RISE OF THIRD WORLD NEUTRALISM • • • • • • 
THE SOVIET UNION AND AFRICAN NEUTRALISM, 
1945-1960 •••••••••••••••• 
~ 
III. THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICAN NEUTRALISM, 
1945-1960 • • • ••• • • • • • • • 
IV. THE NEW FRONTIER AND NEUTRALIST AFRICA. 
V. KWAME NKRUMAH AND GHANA'S INDEPENDENCE 
STRUGGLE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
VI. ORIGINS OF GHANAIAN FOREIGN POLICY • • 










1957-1960 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 69 
VIII. KENNEDY, THE VOLTA DAM PROJECT AND THE 
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NEUTRALISM 
IN PRACTICE • • • • • • • 
CONCLUSION • • 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • 







In late 1961, the governments of U.S. President 
John F. Kennedy and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana came to an 
agreement to build a hydroelectric dam over the Volta River 
in Ghana. For Nkrumah, it was the culmination of a five-
year effort that had many times forced him to submerge his 
African nationalist and anti-imperialist impulses. For 
Kennedy, the Volta Dam project was a concrete example of 
~ 
America's commitment to the aspirations and economic 
development of Africa, and his own tolerance of African 
neutralism. The road to this point in history had not been 
an easy one for either man. For decades the United States 
had ignored Africa. 
But the dawning of the 1960s saw the emergence of 
forces pregnant with implications for American foreign 
policy. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
American policy was irresistibly drawn toward the political 
and diplomatic battlefields of Europe. The world wars had 
oriented two generations of American policymakers to see 
international relations through European eyes. From Stettin 
to Trieste, the center of foreign policy discussion was 
Europe. Heading into the 1960s, the foreign policy 
establishment still consisted of men who had led the 
struggle to save Europe from Nazism and to rebuild it as a 
bulwark against communism. They had worked alongside the 
2 
able of men of Britain and France, absorbing their world 
view and prejudices. 
World War II had unleashed forces that these men 
were unprepared to recognize or understand. For centuries, 
through a mixture of brutal force and paternalism, Europe 
had suppressed the national aspirations of two-thirds of the 
world's peoples. But while the imperial powers of Europe 
had won the war against Hitler, they no longer had either 
the strength or, in Britain's case, the inclination to hold 
~ 
together their colonial empires. Japan's triumphs in the 
East early in the war had shattered the myth of European 
racial superiority. From French Algeria to British Iraq to 
Dutch Indonesia the demands for freedom were heard. In 
1947, India gained its independence. A new era in world 
affairs had begun. 
The decolonization of Asia and Africa created a new 
force in international affairs. Nations long held in thrall 
were unwilling to subordinate their hard-won independence to 
one of the two cold war powers. In a series of conferences 
during the 1950s, the emerging nations of Asia and Africa 
defined an idea of neutralism. At its core, neutralism was 
the rejection of the cold war bloc system represented by 
NATO and the Warsaw pact, and the variations that the United 
States was promoting (i.e., CENTO, SEATO, etc.). It did not 
mean neutrality in the great international concerns of 
peace, economic development, and human rights. It did mean 
3 
that the new nations would not be easily integrated into the 
strategic plans of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
In 1957 Kwame Nkrumah stepped onto the world stage 
as the Prime Minister of Ghana, the first black African 
nation to attain independence. Nkrumah, a graduate of 
Lincoln University and the University of Pennsylvania, 
quickly established himself to the world as Africa's 
foremost champion. From 1957 to 1961, more than twenty-five 
African states emerged from colonialism to take their places 
• 
in the United Nations. The year of 1960 was declared the 
"Year of Africa." It was to be the beginning of a decade 
that would set the future course of American policy toward 
Africa. The question of U.S. support for Ghana's Volta Dam 
project was to be among the most important African policy 
decisions the winner of the 1960 presidential election would 
face. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
background of the U.S. decision to fund the Volta Dam 
project. It will attempt to place that decision in the 
light of historic changes in international politics brought 
about by the decolonization of Africa and the rise of the 
neutralist movement, and to assess whether it represented a 
break with the cold war orientation of American foreign 
policy or merely a complex refinement. Finally, an effort 
will be made to suggest the impact that the Kennedy 
administration's policy toward Ghana may have had over the 




THE COLD WAR, AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE AND 
THE RISE OF THIRD WORLD NEUTRALISM 
International politics following the Second World 
War have been marked by two events of particular importance: 
the cold war between American and the Soviet Union, which 
divided the world into two mutually exclusive camps; and the 
decolonization and enfranchisement in the international 
• 
community of one-third of the world's population. The 
combination of these factors created a "third force" in 
world politics--those nations among the underdeveloped world 
who chose to disassociate themselves from the cold war and 
pursue independent foreign policies, which were based on 
their own interests, not those of the superpowers. 
The first major response of the U.S. to the 
challenge of the Soviet Union was the development of the 
containment doctrine. Formulated in the Truman 
administration by George F. Kennan, containment was based on 
Kennan's interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist belief that 
the victory of socialism over capitalism was inevitable. He 
believed this doctrine caused Soviet foreign policy to be 
cautious, persistent and far-sighted. "In these 
circumstances," Kennan wrote, "it is clear that the main 
element of United States policy toward the Soviet Union must 
be that of a firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
5 
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tendencies. ,,1 The practical result of the containment 
theory was the creation of a system of formal alliances, 
beginning with the Treaty of Rome in 1949, which established 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the mutual 
defense of the United states and Western Europe. This 
policy of collective defense was continued by Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles, who created similar pacts in Latin 
America (the Rio Pact), the Middle East (the Baghdad Pact) 
and Asia (SEATO). The USSR also formed its own military , 
alliance in the Warsaw Pact of 1955. By the time the 
nations of the third world emerged from dependence, the 
world was divided into two rigid camps. 
The World War had an enormous impact on the old 
colonial empires. Six long years of total war had drained 
the resources of Britain and France, and the United States 
was unsympathetic to their attempts to retain their empires. 
While the war had weakened the imperial powers, it had 
invigorated the African nationalists in the colonies, whose 
returning veterans were demanding freedom as a reward for 
their loyalty. In Britain, France and other colonial 
nations, policymakers were more concerned with rebuilding 
their own economies, than with retaining a costly colonial 
system. European governments began to plan for the eventual 
orderly transition to independence. In 1947, Governor Lord 
Louis Mountbatten presided over the peaceful end of English 
rule in India. The following year brought the independence 
7 
of the remainder of British Asia. In 1949, the Dutch East 
Indies were dissolved and free Indonesia emerged, led the by 
veteran nationalist, Sukarno. Following the French defeat 
at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, France relinquished control in 
Indochina. 
The hopes of African nationalists were intensified 
by these events, and they stepped up attempts to organize 
for the independence struggle while at the same time 
encouraging the progress of European plans for peaceful , 
decolonization. Among the more prominent of the African 
nationalists was Kwame Nkrumah, who pioneered African use of 
non-violent protest in the early fifties. Nkrumah 
demonstrated his popularity in 1954 when he was elected 
leader of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in British supervised 
elections. 
In 1957, Ghana peacefully became the first new 
independent state in black Africa since the establishment of 
Liberia in 1830. In 1958 French President Charles de Gaulle 
offered the territories of French Africa a choice of 
independence or self-determination in association with 
France. Only one nation voted for independence, Guinea, 
whose popular leader Sekou Toure had told de Gaulle that he 
would rather be "destitute in freedom, than rich in 
slavery." De Gaulle reacted ruthlessly to the vote of 
"non," withdrawing all French assistance, technical aid, 
records and material. He meant to punish Guinea, and cow 
8 
the African nations still associated with France. 2 
The events of 1957 and 1958 were dwarfed by those of 
1960, which saw the independence of seventeen new African 
states, and dramatically changed the composition of the 
United Nations and world politics in general. The stage was 
set for the emergence of a third force in international 
affairs--neutralism led by the Afro-Asian states. 
Attempts to organize the emerging Afro-Asian states 
dates back to 1957, when newly independent India, led by , 
Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru sponsored the Asian 
Relations Conference in New Dehli. It was attended by 
twenty-eight Afro-Asian nations. The follow-up congress in 
1949, was attended by fifteen nations. In his speeches 
before these conferences, Nehru stressed that the "Asian 
sentiment" for peace and independence should not be ignored 
by the United States and the Soviet Union. In later Afro-
Asian conferences held in the late fifties Nehru reacted 
strongly to the recently created system of alliances (SEATO 
in particular) which he felt threatened to entangle Afro-
Asia in the cold war. He began to press for a positive 
policy of neutralism in the cold war, combined with an 
active policy of encouraging peaceful settlement of 
international disputes. The active portion of this policy 
of non-alignment was incorporated into the April 1954 Sino-
Indian Trade Agreement,and is known as the "five 
principles." These include: respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; noninterference 
in the internal affairs of others; equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful co-existence. 3 
9 
These early conferences were largely ignored outside 
of Asia because they were sparsely attended and dominated by 
Nehru (which caused observers to dismiss them as a soapbox 
for his neutralist views). But the 1955 Bandung conference 
was more representative of the Afro-Asian world (twenty-nine 
states were represented) and was attended by personalities 
• 
strong enough to challenge Nehru. Because the conference 
was attended by both committed and non-aligned Afro-Asian 
nations, it was the forum for a spirited debate on the 
position of the third world in the cold war. The pro-
western states represented were Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Libya, Lebanon, Turkey, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Ceylon, 
Thailand, Burma, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Vietnam, Japan 
and Liberia. The self-designated neutralist nations 
included India, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, China, Nepal, 
North Korea, Egypt, Ghana, and Syria. Tensions between 
these two groups were subdued until the debate over the 
usefulness of military pacts, which occurred in the closing 
days of the conference. 
The debate began with a comprehensive defense of 
alignment by General Zorlu of Turkey, drawing on his 
nation's experience with Russia. His argument that 
collective security pacts were the only means of defense for 
10 
the small nations was passionately criticized by Nehru in a 
speech which had a great impact on the conference. 
I belong to neither bloc and I propose to belong to 
neither whatever happens in the world. • • • I am afraid 
of nobody. I suffer from no fear complex. My country 
suffers from no fear complex. We rely on nobody except 
on the friendship of others, we rely on ourselves and 
none other •••• Even a single country can make a 
difference when the scales are evenly balanced. • • • If 
I join any of these big groups I lose my identity, I 
have no views left. • • • If all the world were to be 
divided up between these two blocs what would be the 
result? The inevitable result would be war •••• It is 
an intolerably thought to me that the great countries of 
Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom 
only to degrade and hbmiliate themselves in this way. 
• • • Every pact has brought insecurity and not security 
to the countries which have entered into them • • • the 
so-called Five Principles • • • is not a magic formula. 
• •• It is something which meets the needs of the day. 
• • • Unless one thinks that there is no alternative to 
this except war, an~ to be prepared for war, this ••• 
has to be accepted. 
The aligned nations made an attempt to counter 
Nehru's assertions but were unable to match the influence of 
his arguments. An Iraqi delegate asked mockingly, "Are you 
ready to bring us together the weak and small nations--and 
form another bloc? • • • But by not doing that you leave us 
alone in small entities, cut to pieces and our existence 
threatened every moment." Carlos Romulo of the Philippines 
defended his SEATO membership, "It was made out that it was 
humiliating for us to join a regional group. As a matter of 
fact, we would not like to do so but we have to defend 
ourselves."S 
Despite the large representation the Bandung 
conference was an Asian affair, influenced by the pacifistic 
Indian form of neutralism and focused on issues of concern 
to Asians, such as collective defense pacts, UN 
representation for China, and peaceful settlement of 
disputes through the UN. Africa and its prime concern, 
colonialism, were shunted aside. Only three black African 
states were represented, and it took great efforts by one 
Liberian to obtain a seat on the colonial drafting 
committee. 6 
The Bandung conference is often cited as the 
I 
beginning of the non-aligned movement, but it actually 
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signaled the end to the Asian-phase of neutralism dominated 
by Nehru's strong commitment to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes at any cost. The new phase would be dominated by 
Arabs and Africans, who envisioned a more militant mission 
for neutralism. By 1955 it seemed clear to Arabs and 
Africans that Palestine and dependent Africa would not be 
liberated by Nehruist conciliation. The leader of this new 
phase was Egypt's president, Abdel Gamal Nasser, who in late 
1957 hosted the First Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity 
conference. Nasser, who had recently rebuffed the attempt 
of France, Britain and Israel to seize the Suez Canal, 
focused the conference squarely on the question of 
colonialism and imperialism. This was revealed in the 
opening speech by Anwar Sadat, a blistering attack on 
colonialism. The conference formed liberation committees 
for each of the colonial territories, and its closing 
12 
communique condemned "imperialism in all its forms and 
manifestations.,,7 Yet despite the large number of Africans 
involved, and the anti-colonial resolutions, Africans were 
not influential at the conference. Until more African 
nations were independent they would have no real voice in 
neutralist politics. 
The First and Second All African Peoples Congresses 
held at Accra in 1958 were the first conferences attended by 
solely African sovereign states which dealt with uniquely 
• 
African problems. Of the eight nations represented, four 
were pro-western (Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia and Sudan) and 
four were neutralist (Ghana, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia), so 
the Accra conferences revealed the areas of common agreement 
across ideological boundaries. Among the points of 
agreement were: a call for majority rule; the importance of 
African unity; and the desire to keep the cold war out of 
Africa. 8 
Unlike Asia where the definite threat of Soviet or 
Chinese expansionism forced many newly independent states to 
align directly with the West, Africa did not face such a 
threat and both radicals and moderates were in agreement 
over the need to avoid such pressure. 
There were two principles on which African non-
alignment was based. The first was the theory of 
continental sovereignty, the belief that the Africans should 
be able to manage their affairs without the harassment of 
13 
the outside world. 
Closely related concepts were "pan-Africanism," 
which sought to unify Africa into a single nation-state, and 
"the African personality," the idea that there is a common 
African civilization which unites all Africans and contains 
lessons for the western world. An extreme example of the 
belief in continental sovereignty was revealed in Nkrumah's 
speech welcoming the delegates to the Accra conferences. 
Three alternatives are open to African states; first 
to unite and to save ~ur continent; secondly to continue 
in disunity and to disintegrate; or thirdly to sellout 
and capitulate before the forces of imperialism and 
neocolonialism. As each year passes~ our failure to 
unite strengthens our enemies •••• 
The second principle behind African non-alignment 
was the idea of "positive" or "active" neutralism. This 
principle held that Africa's desire to remain outside of the 
cold war did not preclude an active foreign policy in 
pursuit of such goals as world peace, self-determination, 
and international justice. The policy was as important to 
pro-western regimes as it was to the radicals who designed 
it. Thus in the 1959 issue of Foreign Affairs, conservative 
Nigerian President Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa states: 
Our foreign policy has never been one of neutrality, but 
rather non-alignment. We have never been neutral in 
African affairs, nor can wrObe neutral in matters 
pertaining to world peace. 
And within the same issue the radical President of Guinea 
Sekou Toure wrote: 
14 
African neutralism, then, is not shameful indifference. 
• • • It is something active, a participating force, an 
active agent in the struggle for the achievement ?t a 
world society--emancipated, fraternal and united. 
The unity of the Accra conference was unable to 
survive the impact of the proliferation of states in 1960, 
especially the more conservative ex-French community 
members, and the Congo crisis which by its nature split 
Africa. In late 1960 the francophone states, with the 
notable exceptions of Guinea, Mali and Togo, met at 
Brazzaville and Abidjan tb discuss plans for economic union. 
Among the resolutions passed were ones supporting the UN 
mission in the Congo and de Gaulle's idea for a referendum 
in Algeria. In reaction, the five radical states, Guinea, 
Ghana, Mali, Egypt and Morocco, met in January 1961 at 
Casablanca, and passed a set of resolutions almost 
completely opposite from the Brazzaville and Abidjan 
agreements. They condemned the UN mission, and the Algerian 
referendum. 12 The matter was further confused when the 
Monrovia conference was held in January 1962. Several 
African nations attended; they did not include the 
Casablanca group. 
It would seem that the split in Africa was 
ideological and must have changed views toward neutralism. 
But the resolutions passed by the three conferences reveal 
no difference over the issue of neutralism. There is also 
little evidence that the rift caused a greater alignment 
with the superpowers. With the end of the Congo conflict in 
15 
1961, and Algerian independence in 1962, tensions cooled to 
the point that by 1963 all nations were able to agree to a 
charter for an Organization of African States, based on the 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SOVIET UNION AND AFRICAN NEUTRALISM, 
1945-1960 
The Bandung conference had a great impact on Soviet 
theorists and policy-makers. It showed them that the anti-
colonial movement was poised on the edge of success, led by 
the very national-bourgeois leaders they had denounced for 
years as "servants of imperialism," who had "already proved 
I 
their incapability of pursuing the course of national 
liberation.,,1 
The policy towards the developing world, which the 
Bandung conference provoked the Soviets to reevaluate, had 
roots back to the early years of the revolution. By 1920, 
Lenin began to see that revolution in Europe was not as near 
and inevitable as he had once thought, and began to look to 
the East, which he believed had "been definitely drawn into 
the maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement." In his 
theses on colonialism of the Sixth Party Congress, Lenin 
asserted that the national liberation movements in the 
colonies "only salvation is the victory of Soviet power over 
world imperialism." Within the third world, communists must 
only support the "bourgeois-democratic national movements' 
on the condition that they allow the creation of proletarian 
parties "educated to understand their special task--to fight 
the bourgeois-democratic movements within their own 
17 
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country. ,,2 Thus the Soviets would only support nationalists 
who would allow rival parties committed to their eventual 
destruction. This point was reinforced by the Sixth World 
Congress of the Comintern's 1928 Theses, which urged local 
communists to exploit the independence struggle to achieve 
"the basic strategic aim of the Communist 1-1ovement in the 
bourgeois-democratic revolution--the hegemony of the 
proletariat. 113 They were also instructed to fight such 
"class traitors" as M. K. Gandhi and Sun Yat-sen. The 1928 , 
Theses remained policy through the Stalinist period, despite 
the fact that their major premise--that the victory over 
colonialism could only be achieved if led by proletariat--
was contradicted by events such as the independence of India 
and the rising importance of Africa. Indeed following the 
Second World War, Stalin adopted the doctrine of A. A. 
Zhdanov that divided the world into two mutually exclusive 
camps--the communists and the non-communists. This further 
limited Soviet actions in the third world, which was already 
moving towards the creation of a neutral third camp. 
Mirroring the attitudes of America's John Foster Dulles, 
Stalin urged collective defense and castigated neutralism as 
"conniving at aggression.,,4 
The most authoritative statement of late-Stalinist 
theory towards the third world is contained in a 1950 paper 
by the dean of Soviet Africanists, Ivan I. Potekhin. In it 
he stated: 
• • • the Stalinist theory of the colonial revolution 
proceeds from the premise that the solution of the 
colonial problem and the liberation of the oppressed 
peoples from colonial slavery, is impossible without a 
proletarian sevolution and the overthrow of 
imperialism. 
Therefore in 1950--some thirty years after the 
19 
revolution--Stalinist theorists were unable to believe that 
colonialism could be overthrown by the colonial peoples 
themselves; it could only happen with the overthrow of the 
imperialist Western nations--by European proletarians. 
Potekhin pinpointed the r~ason he felt this was true: the 
anti-colonial movement was led by the national bourgeoisie, 
with only a small proletarian element. Every scientific 
socialist knew "full and final victory of the colonial 
revolution can be achieved only if and when the proletarian 
plays a leading role." Ignoring India and Indonesia, he 
asserted, "the petty-bourgeois nationalist organizations and 
parties have already proved their incapability of pursuing 
the course of national liberation."G In 1954, just one year 
before he was to playa major part in the reevaluation of 
this policy, Potekhin again leveled his guns at the national 
bourgeoisie, attacking the Convention Peoples Party, led by 
Kwame Nkrumah, because it "reflected the interests of the 
big national bourgeoisie and did not justify the confidence 
of the people.,,7 Seven years later Potekhin would be in 
the receiving line, congratulating Nkrumah for winning the 
Lenin Peace Prize. 
20 
In June 1955, Potekhin published an article on the 
semi-independent Gold Coast (then led by Nkrumah), which 
moderated the earliest attacks, presaging a change in 
policy. At the 20th Party Congress in February of 1956, the 
Party affirmed a change in policy towards an acceptance of 
"bourgeois nationalism." It appears now that Potekhin and 
other Soviet Africanists had been quietly lobbying for this 
for some time. 8 
The change was influenced by three factors, the most 
I 
important being the death of Stalin. It is clear that no 
reevaluation of policy on this issue could occur while 
Stalin lived, because he was as much the author of Leninist 
doctrine on nationalism as Lenin himself. Stalin's 
theoretical work on bourgeois nationalism was what brought 
him to the attention of Lenin, well before the Russian 
Revolution. In his early writings, Stalin held that 
nationalism was anti-socialist because it allowed 
capitalists to divide the working class along national 
lines. Only a united internationalist working class could 
bring about the world revolution envisioned by communists at 
that time. The example of the First World War, when the 
socialists of France, England and Germany fought against 
each other in their respective national armies, appeared to 
prove that nationalism was antithetical to socialism. After 
the Revolution, Stalin was elected Commissar for 
Nationalities and was a major force in the unification of 
21 
the Soviet Union. His main enemies in this endeavor were 
the "bourgeois nationalists" of Georgia, Poland and the 
Ukraine. He could not be expected to embrace the same enemy 
(at least in narrow ideological terms) in Africa. 9 But with 
Stalin's death, academics were given a great deal more 
freedom to question what, under Stalin, was unquestionable. 
A second factor was the rising importance within 
Soviet circles of the Soviet Africanists, particularly I. I. 
Potekhin. Potekhin had faithfully upheld the Stalinist 
I 
theory, while creating institutions for research on Africa 
which ultimately produced information revealing the weakness 
of that theory. The death of Stalin opened the door for 
Africanists to reevaluate theory in the light of new 
information and for them to have a chance to influence 
policy.10 It must be emphasized that while this research 
was not public, it did circulate freely among the Soviet 
policy elite. 
The third and decisive factor was the rise of the 
influence of the Afro-Asians in world affairs and the now-
apparent fact that the struggle against colonialism was 
coming to fruition with the formerly despised national 
bourgeoisie at its head. If the Soviet Union did not accept 
the friendship of the national-bourgeoisie led states, they 
would have no friends in the Afro-Asian world, and would 
lose an opportunity to exploit the obvious anti-colonial 
beliefs of that bloc for its own benefit. 
The change in theory opened new doors for Soviet 
policy. The new Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's 
policy of peaceful co-existence signaled a change towards 
22 
economic and political (as opposed to military) competition 
with the West, and Africa was extremely fertile ground, once 
ideological impediments were removed. 
In the period from 1956 to 1961 the Soviets 
disbursed a significant amount of aid; from July 1959 to 
July 1961, $197 million in loans went to five African , 
nations. The motives of the Soviets were political, as one 
Soviet writer admits: 
In its relations with the capitalists the Soviet Union 
utilizes economic contacts principally as an important 
lever for • • • establishing the desired conf+~ence 
between states with different social systems. 
The tactical change in attitudes toward the 
national-bourgeoisie, did not mean the abandonment of 
African communists, to the contrary, Soviet aid usually 
strengthened pro-Soviet members of nationalist governments. 
It did mean, however, that good diplomatic relations, not 
conversion to communism, was to be the controlling factor in 
Soviet policy. 
The rapid increase in Soviet activity in Africa was 
noticed in the United States, but there was little 
understanding of the factors behind it. When American 
commentators saw African nationalists taking Soviet aid, 
supporting the Eastern Bloc on colonial issues, and 
criticizing the West, they assumed they were communists. 
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What they did not realize was that the Soviets' advantage 
was due to their having made their peace with the neutralist 
world--something the United states had yet to do. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICAN NEUTRALISM, 
1945-1960 
The initial U.S. reaction to the neutralist 
movement was hostile. The United States was engaged in an 
attempt to create a system of collective security among 
Asian nations in the attempt to contain Communism. 
Neutralism was a direct threat to these efforts. The 
I 
American reaction was capsulized in a 1951 statement by John 
Foster Dulles, then a consultant to the Secretary of State 
on Asian affairs: 
There are some who feel that neutrality is safer than 
collective security. Neutrality would, of course, be 
normal if we were living in a world where aggression was 
permanently banished. But in a world where there are 
still aggressors, ~eutfality is no protection, rather it 
encourages aggresslon. 
When Dulles became Secretary of State in 1953, 
neutralism was merely an aspect of Asian policy, but over 
the next seven years neutralism would become the dominant 
principle of foreign policy for one-third of the world's 
nations. As the neutralist world expanded, Dulles' rigid 
opposition became a major obstacle to U.S. relations with 
this third world. There is evidence that some within the 
Eisenhower administration understood this reality and had 
the President's ear. In this prepared statement to the 
June 6, 1956, news conference, Eisenhower said: 
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If you are waging peace, you can't be too 
particular sometimes about the special attitudes that 
different countries take. We were a young country once, 
and our whole policy for the first 150 years was, we 
were neutral. We constantly asserted we were neutral in 
the wars of the world and wars of Europe and its 
antagonism. 
Now today there are certain' nations that say they 
are neutral. This doesn't necessarily mean what it is 
so often interpreted to mean, neutral as between right 
and wrong or decency and indecency. 
They are using the'term "neutral" with respect to 
attachment to military alliances. And may I point out 
that I cannot see that that is always t~ the 
disadvantage of such a country as ours. 
The President's remarks caused an immediate uproar 
I . 
in the Department of State. The next day a statement was 
released to the press, which "clarified" (to the point of 
contradicting) the President's statement and brought it more 
into line with the views of the Secretary. The press 
release stressed that the President did not believe 
neutralism was suitable in all nations, and that he strongly 
supported the principle of collective defence treaties which 
"represent the best and most effective means of preserving 
world order." It stated further that "the President does 
believe that there are special conditions which justify 
political neutrality but that no nation has the right to be 
indifferent to the fate of another.,,3 
Dulles further reasserted control over American 
policy towards neutralism with a speech two days later 
before the graduating class at Iowa State College. He 
defended his policy of collective security treaties, calling 
it a "peace insurance policy": 
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These treaties abolish, as between the parties, the 
principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation 
can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to 
the fate of others. This has increasingly become an 
obsolete conception, and except under very exceptional 
circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted 
conception. The free world today is stronger, and peace 
is more secure, because so many free nations 
courageously recognize • • • that their own peace and 
safety would be endangered by assault on freedom 
elsewhere. 
Thus, policy was set back on Dulles' course. 
Whereas the President's initial remarks implied a general 
right to neutrality, his later press release only admitted , 
that there are "special circumstances which justify" 
neutrality. Dulles narrowed those to "exceptional 
circumstances,' and in a 1957 speech before an Associated 
Press banquet he denied any justifying circumstances: 
Today, nations born to independence are born into a 
world one part of which is ruled by despotism and the 
other part which stays free by accepting the concept of 
interdependence [Dulles' term for the collective 
security system]. There is no safe middle qround. 
International communism is on the prowl to capture 
those nations whose leaders feel that newly acquired 
sovereign rights have to be displayed by flouting other 
independent nations--that kind of sovereignty is 
suicidal sovereignty •••• 
We want the new independence of others to be 
something better than a brief tw~light preceding the 
blackout of Communist despotism. 
There were three major flaws underlying the Dulles 
doctrine. First, it rested on the assumption that 
neutralism was a passive doctrine of indifference, and 
ignores statements to the contrary by African leaders. 
Secondly, Dulles did not understand that neutralism did not 
imply diplomatic equidistance. This caused him to write off 
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as communist any nation that refused to support all of the 
administration's policies. But Dulles' gravest error was a 
complete underestimation of the ability of African nations 
and leaders to maintain their independence and freedom of 
action without getting engulfed by the "black out of 
Communist despotism." The end result of Dulles' flawed 
policy was to handicap the United States in its competition 
with the Soviets, who had already discarded their 
ideological impediments. 
I 
The flaws of the Dulles doctrine were apparent in 
the administration's actions following Guinean independence. 
In 1958, French President Charles de Gaulle gave the French 
West African colonies a choice of remaining within the 
French Community as autonomous nations or having 
independence without French aid. The Guinean nationalist 
leader Sekou Toure convinced the Guinean people to vote for 
independence. For their ingratitude and as an example to 
the other states, de Gaulle ordered all French assistance 
cut off immediately. Records were destroyed and phones 
ripped from the wall in the exodus of French personnel. The 
Guineans appealed to the United States, among other western 
states, for assistance, but Eisenhower refused to upset his 
fellow general. With little alternative, Toure accepted 
Soviet assistance. This incident was cited often by critics 
of Eisenhower's policy. In the 1960 campaign, Kennedy 
denounced the Republicans charging, "Guinea has moved toward 
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the communist bloc because of our neglect.,,6 
Kennedy was not the only critic of the 
administration's policy. There was much dissatisfaction 
with the Dulles anti-neutralist doctrine within Eisenhower's 
own state Department. Many state Department experts felt 
the policy was an impediment to countering the aggressive 
Soviet effort to forge positive and enduring relationships 
with the non-aligned nations. The United States, they 
believed, was in danger of permanently identifying itself, 
I 
in the eyes of Africa, with the hated colonialists. 
One of these disaffected officials was Edmond 
Gullion, veteran Asian expert and friend and advisor to 
Senator John F. Kennedy; another was Vernon McKay. McKay 
headed the Africa bureau of the Office of Dependent Area 
Affairs until September 1956, when he quit to organize a 
program of African studies at the School of Advanced 
International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. In 
July of 1959 he published a detailed critique of United 
states policy towards Africa, which among other things 
criticized the Dulles doctrine on neutralism: 
In the political field our most promising 
opportunity at the moment is to relax pressure on 
Africans to join the Western camp. Such cliches as the 
"battle for men's minds" and the "uncommitted nations" 
have outlived their usefulness. The trouble with the 
slogan "battle for men's minds" is that it seems to 
imply that Africans must somehow lose their minds to 
either the Russian or the American mentality. And that 
is just what African leaders don't want to do. They 
want to be distinctively African. The phrase 
"uncommitted nations" is even more outmoded because 
Africa's made it abundantly clear [at the Accra 
conference] that they are committed to the neutralist 
idea of a distinctively African personali,y making 
itself felt as a force in world affairs." 
He went on to say that the "most we can reasonably 
hope for ••• is neutrality with a Western orientation," 
and that because of its colonial experience Africa is wary 
31 
of both Soviet and American pressure. Therefore, "the most 
influential great power in the new Africa may be the power 
that succeeds in making its influence and its presence felt 
I 
in the most unobtrusive manner."s 
McKay's criticisms were echoed in the academic 
community and by Democratic politicians, many of whom were 
positioning themselves for the 1960 election. These critics 
were not only questioning the administration's neutralism 
policy but the basic tenets of American policy toward 
Africa. 
In 1959, Senator Kennedy's subcommittee on Africa 
commissioned the Program of African Studies of Northwestern 
University to prepare a report on Africa, which was written 
by Program Director Melville J. Herskovits and published on 
October 1959. The report reflected the views of an emerging 
academic subdiscipline that was just beginning to establish 
its identity as such. With the rise of interest in Africa 
in the late 1950s, and the creation of Area and Language 
Centers under the National Defense Education Act of 1954, 
students of Africa began to consider themselves as 
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Africanists. In 1957 the African Studies Association was 
founded. The field was young, exciting and offered young 
scholars the opportunity to be in the forefront of what 
appeared to be a major new arena of world politics. Because 
of the nature of the field, and the rapid decolonization of 
Africa, early Africanists were very concerned about U.S. 
foreign policy toward Africa. It was these scholars who 
contributed to the Herskovits report. 
The report surveyed the political and economic 
I 
condition of Africa, drew fifteen sets of conclusions and 
recommended specific policies to address them. The sets 
which most concern this study are 2, 3 and 4: 
Conclusions 
2. U.S. policy during the 
past decade has been based 
on the assumption that 
Africa, as a continent 
under the control of our 
NATO associates, can be 
given minor consideration. 
3. The broadest interests 
of the United States lie 
in furthering amicable 
relations with the peoples 
and governments of 
Africa. • • • 
4. It is important that 
communism and African 
nationalism not be con-
fused. The choices that 
African states will make 
as regards the world 
struggle will be influenced 
Recommendations 
2. The United States must 
treat Africa, as a major policy 
area ••• on a level with 
other policy areas, particu-
larly Europe. 
3. U.S. policy in Africa must 
facilitate the implementation 
of mutual interests with 
African countries. It should 
favor their development free 
from outside interference • 
as this is defined in terms of 
their own values. 
4. The United states should 
recognize that for African 
states as policy of non-
alignment is in the best 
interes~s of the West and 
Africa. 
Conclusions 
by the use of perceptive 
insights of African needs 
cast in African terms • 
Recommendations 
The conclusions of the Herskovits report were 
strongly supported by testimony in the hearing which 
followed its release. Africanists David Apter, Eliot Berg 
(who later served in the Kennedy Agency for International 
Development), Rupert Emerson, Ruth Schacter and Immanuel 
Wallerstein formed the Africa League to present more 
I 
effectively their case to Congress. Also testifying in 
support of the report were George Houser, Executive 
Director of the American Committee on Africa (which was 
founded in 1953 by white and black liberals to promote 
united states-African understanding); Wayne Fredericks of 
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the Ford Foundation (Deputy Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, 1961-66); and Taylor Ostrander of American Metal 
Climax (a corporation with interests in neutralist Ghana and 
Guinea).10 
The Eisenhower administration also carne under attack 
by Democratic liberals, especially as the 1960 campaign 
neared. The earliest political critic was Chester Bowles, a 
successful advertising executive, who during World War II 
was the Director of the Office of Price Administration, and 
who had served as Ambassador to India from 1951 to 1953. 
After the election of Eisenhower he published his memoirs, 
wrote a comparative analysis of revolution and lectured. 
One series of lectures was given in April 1956 at the 
University of California at Berkeley and published as 
Africa's Challenge to America. 11 The thesis of Bowles' 
lectures was that the United states had lost sight of its 
revolutionary roots in relation to Africa. If its policy 
towards colonialism did not change, then America was in 
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danger of losing its mantle as the symbol of freedom to the 
Soviet Union, which was posing as the torchbearer of African 
freedom. While Bowles did not mention neutralism, he 
I 
expressed approval of African nationalism and praised the 
United Nations for providing "a forum in which nationalist 
aspirations can be expressed." But even more influential 
than his writings was his active involvement with politics, 
and the advice he gave to Adlai E. Stevenson and John F. 
Kennedy. A speechwriter for Stevenson during the 1956 
campaign, Bowles was the major foreign policy advisor to 
Kennedy during his 1960 campaign. After the election he was 
appointed Undersecretary of State and played a major role in 
the development of the initial policies towards the third 
world, as well as the recruitment of energetic and 
innovative liberals for the State Department and the Foreign 
Service. 12 
Another critic of the administration's policy was 
Eisenhower's opponent in· the 1952 and 1956 presidential 
elections, former Illinois Governor Adlai E. Stevenson. 
Stevenson's interest in Africa intensified in the late 
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fifties. In 1955 and 1957, he visited Africa, and in May of 
1960, he published "The New Africa: A Guide and A Proposal" 
in Harpers. In this article he argued that the United 
States had profound interest in preserving good relations 
with Africa. However, he wrote: 
When I speak of maintaining Africa's present Western 
orientation, I do not have in mind a specific African 
commitment to support the West in the power conflict. 
On the contrary, the happiest outcome for both Africa 
and the West would be if Cold War pressures could be 
excluded from the African continent altogether. If non-
involvement or neutrality is to be the aid of the New 
Africa--coupled with! determination to keep itself free 
from any external domination ••• that aim iS1~ertainlY 
compatible with America's hopes and interests. 
Furthermore, he argues that helping Africa to remain 
free of the Cold War is "worth many of the billions that 
could be so easily squandered countering subversion, winning 
lost ground or fighting wars.,,14 
Thus the 1960 presidential campaign began with a 
growing climate for change in American policy toward 
neutralist nations. Significant sectors of the 
governmental, political and academic establishments were 
discussing a re-evaluation of policy. Into this debate 
stepped presidential aspirant John F. Kennedy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NEW FRONTIER AND NEUTRALIST AFRICA 
By temperament, ability and experience, the 
politician most able to grasp the historical forces that 
were challenging U.S. foreign policy was John F. Kennedy. 
From the beginning of his political career, Kennedy had been 
interested in the third world. In 1951, he visited the Far 
East and on his return denounced western colonialism 
• (particularly in French Indochina) on the floor of the 
House. 1 As a freshman senator in July of 1953, he sought to 
amend the Mutual Security bill, to provide that funds "be 
administered in such a way to encourage • • • the 
independence desired by the Associated States [Vietnam, 
Laos, Cambodia].112 In April 1954, he gave a major speech 
warning against U.S. intervention to save the French from 
being defeated at Dien Bien Phu, and again he called for 
independence--stopping short of demanding French withdrawal. 
Kennedy's African education began in early 1957 when 
he met with Habib Bourguiba, Jr., the son of the president 
of Tunisia, and Mongi Slim, Tunisia's ambassador to the 
United States. Joined by the Algerian National Front's 
Washington representative Abdekader Chanderli, the North 
Africans educated Kennedy on the complex history of the 
Algerian war for independence from France, and won him over 
to their cause. 3 
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In the summer of 1957, he gave two major speeches in 
which he criticized the Eisenhower administration for its 
blind support of French colonialism: 
The single most important test of American foreign 
policy today is how we meet the challenge of 
imperialism, what we do to further man's desire to be 
free. On this test more than any other, this nation 
will be critically judged by the uncommitted millions in 
Asia and Africa • • • [United states support for France] 
has furnished powerful ammunition to anti-Western 
propagandists • • • and will be the most troublesome 
item facing the October conference in Accra of the free 
nations of Africa, who hope by easing the transition to 
independence of other African colonies, to seek common 
paths by which
4
that gteat continent can remain aligned 
with the West. 
Kennedy's speech was severely criticized by the New York 
Times, which said he "added fuel to a raging fire," and to a 
lesser degree by Eleanor Roosevelt and Adlai stevenson. But 
the harshest attack came from Truman's former Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson, who characterized the speech as rash and 
naive. French opinion was divided along political lines 
with criticism from the pro-government papers, and favorable 
editorials in L'Express and other papers opposed to the 
war. 5 
The reputation Kennedy gained from his interest in 
Algeria and Africa made him a natural candidate to chair the 
African subcommittee created by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in 1958. Kennedy and his colleagues on the 
subcommittee, Mike Mansfield, Frank Church and Albert Gore, 
held hearings that year on Africa in which America's 
foremost Africanists testified. In June of 1959, Kennedy 
delivered a speech before the Second Annual Conference of 
the American Society of African Culture. He began with a 
knowledgeable exposition of the problems of modern Africa 
and then turned to the question of America's interests in 
Africa. "Our goal, for the good of the West, is a strong 
Africa," he said; "And no people can become strong in a 
climate of servitude and social indignity. What can the 
united state do?" Primarily, he noted, the United States 
could increase aid through the Mutual Security Program and 
~ 
an expanded Development Loan Fund. "While the benefits to 
our national security from a new approach to Africa cannot 
be overlooked," Kennedy concluded; "Let us never assist 
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Africa merely because we are afraid of Russian assistance in 
Africa. Let us never convince the people of that continent 
that we are interested in them only as pawns in the Cold 
war.,,6 To sharpen his knowledge of African affairs, Kennedy 
met with several African leaders, including Telli Diallo and 
Alex Quaison-Sackey, the UN Ambassadors of Guinea and Ghana 
respectively. On November 1, 1959, he met with Guinean 
President Sekou Toure at Disneyland. The meeting is 
recounted by the U.S. Ambassador to Guinea, John Morrow, who 
was present: 
Senator Kennedy then expressed his keen interest in 
Guinean independence and in the struggle confronting 
Toure to maiptain this independence. Turning to me, he 
said that, with all due respect to me and the party 
which I represented, he would like to go on the record 
as assuring President Toure that, if the Democratic 
Party came into power in the 1960 election, it would 
have a great interest in the prog,ess of Guinea and 
other emerging nations of Africa. 
At that time, Toure expressed his admiration for Kennedy's 
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stand on Algerian independence, a remark Kennedy was to hear 
echoed in many of his meetings with Africans before and 
after his election. 
In August of 1960, Kennedy had frank discussions of 
Africa's economic problems with K. A. Gbedemah, Ghanaian 
Minister of Economy.8 
Toward the end of'1959, Kennedy began preparations 
for his run for the presidency in 1960. In February 1960, 
Kennedy persuaded Stevenson loyalist and liberal theorist 
Chester Bowles to serve as his foreign policy advisor. 
As early as November 1959, Kennedy began to 
criticize Eisenhower's policies toward the third world. He 
decried the "eight gray years • • • that the locusts have 
eaten" and attacked several areas where he felt the 
administration had allowed United States prestige and 
interests to deteriorate. One of the areas was foreign 
policy, and Kennedy criticized Eisenhower for not countering 
Soviet aid policy vigorously enough. "When we abruptly 
abandoned the Aswan Dam in Egypt • • • the Russians went 
ahead to finance it," he said, "while we starve the 
Development loan Fund • • • the Sino-Soviet bloc has already 
passed us in economic assistance to selected key areas.,,9 
In June of 1960, just before the Democratic 
convention, Kennedy released a major position paper on 
foreign policy, outlining a twelve-point agenda, two of 
which are relevant to this study. One point called for an 
increase in the flow of capital from the west to the third 
world to frustrate Communist policy and "[enable] emerging 
nations to achieve economic as well as political 
independence." The other dealt with Africa: 
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We must greatly increase our efforts to encourage the 
newly emerging natione of Africa--to persuade them that 
they do not have to turn to Moscow--to help them achieve 
the economic progress on which the welfare of their 
people fad ability to resist Communist subversion 
depend. 
After Kennedy's election he immediately created a 
number of task forces to study possible policy directions. 
The Task Force on Africa was headed by political scientist 
Robert C. Good, who had written an article in 1960 that 
questioned the characterization of Guinea's Sekou Toure as a 
communist. For Good, Toure, like his fellow African 
leaders, was primarily an African nationalist, and "he knows 
that his ambitions as an African leader are forfeited the 
moment Guinea loses all initiative of action to the East.,,11 
The Task Force's final report supported non-alignment and 
suggested that the United States should "respond 
affirmatively to reasonable aid requests, but opposed using 
aid as political bribery for cold war purposes •••• " It 
stressed that U.S. policy in Africa should be "low-key and 
practical and in harmony with the wishes of Africa's own 
nationalist leaders.,,12 
The President's Inaugural Address incorporated the 
new change in policy. Kennedy evoked the Bowles theme of 
the United States as the first revolutionary state and then 
sent his message to Africa: 
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To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of 
the free, we pledge our word that one form of control 
shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a 
far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to 
find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope 
to find them strongly~supporting their own freedom--and 
to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly 
sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up 
inside. 
To those peoples in the huts and villages of half 
the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, 
we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, 
for whatever period is required--not because the 
communists may be doing it, not1~ecause we seek their 
votes, but because it is right. 
The commitment to tolerance of neutralism was 
expanded and elaborated in a speech by the U.S. observer to 
the Economic Commission on Africa, Walter Kotschnig, in 
which he told his African audience that the basic tenets of 
United States policy were a wish to see Africa "grow and 
prosper" in freedom, a conviction not to "impose our own 
views and ways of life on Africa," and the desire "to do 
everything possible to keep the cold war out of Africa." 
Then Kotschnig outlined the economic aspects of the 
new tolerance: 
We have provided substantial and practical help to 
Africa and shall continue to provide aid without any 
strings attached. • • • 
I want to stress that we do not want to impose our 
own socio-economic system on countries which seek our 
help • • • we fully recognize the importance of the 
public,sector • 14. in newly developing 
countr1es. • • • 
This was an important change in American policy 
because many African economies were pUblic-sector dominant 
and the Eisenhower administration had refused to assist the 
public sector, in effect denying many nations aid. The 
conservative economists in the administration believed such 
assistance fostered socialism. Africans, however, believed 
~ 
the United States was trying to impose its own economic 
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theories on them--theories that were profoundly out of touch 
with African realities. This new, more realistic, policy 
put the Kennedy administration on even footing with the 
USSR, which had been giving state-to-state economic aid with 
considerable political benefit. 
One problem with the no-strings aid policy was 
selling it to a Congress that was usually unwilling to 
appropriate foreign aid unless it was justified in terms of 
national security. The administration had to make this 
connection if it hoped to pass the Foreign Aid Act of 1962. 
In a major policy speech on foreign aid given in May of 
1961. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles defended the 
no-strings aid policy as an anti-communist measure. He 
began by describing how the Communists were now in a "total' 
offensive against the West, which had shifted from the 
military to the economic sphere. He then ridiculed the 
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previous way of dealing with it, which was "piece-meal" 
assistance to nations that had "the noisiest Communists" and 
only limited aid to others. Such an approach tended to 
convert local communism into a sort of "natural resource." 
Furthermore, this policy put the United States in an 
"eternally defensive position," always reacting to Soviet 
actions, with no constructive policy of its own. The other 
alternative was to use the resources of the West to help the 
underdeveloped world to create a way of life that makes 
I 
Marxism irrelevant. Bowles described a "world revolution" 
for independence, nationalism and dignity: 
Let us make it clear that our assistance program are 
not designed to check or divert the world revolution 
• we have no such desire. Our purpose is to help 
this revolution achieve its true goals because we know 
that such a development will contribute to our own 
security and well-being. • • • We have no intention of 
attaching political strings to our aid, of requiring 
coun~r~es t? sVgport U.S. policies as a condition to 
rece1v1ng a1d. 
Bowles concluded by linking the "fate of America" 
with the "fate of the billion and a half people" living in 
the underdeveloped world. "Our survival no longer depends 
on guns and tanks and bombs alone," he said. It depended, 
he continued, on the price of rice in southeast Asia, the 
dignity of a citizen in the Congo, and the security of a 
West Berliner. "The struggle for human freedom cannot be 
compartmentalized.'" 6 
The success of the new policy would depend on the 
quality and inclinations of the people appointed to carry it 
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out. The first foreign policy appointment, that of 
G. Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, was a positive signal. Williams, the 
progressive governor of Michigan and proponent of civil 
rights, had at a crucial point in the Democratic Convention 
pledged the delegates he controlled to Kennedy. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., describes him as having a "clear and 
strong vision of the American role as a friend of African 
independence and development," but faults him for not being 
6 
"too proficient in the intramural warfare of the Department 
of State." But Kennedy and Williams were of the same mind 
on Africa, and "when problems made their painful climb 
through bureaucratic conflicts, Kennedy ordinarily decided 
them Williams' way.,,17 
The most important foreign policy position was that 
of Secretary of State. Kennedy was slow to fill this 
position, in large part because of the political campaigning 
by Adlai Stevenson's supporters who felt he was owed it for 
his service to the Party. But Kennedy felt that Stevenson 
was too indecisive and offered him the UN ambassadorship at 
cabinet rank. Senator William Fulbright was closely 
considered, but his segregationist record did not fit with a 
pro-African policy. The decision came between Chester 
Bowles, to whom Kennedy was obligated for his advice and 
support during the campaign, and Dean Rusk, who had wide 
experience in State under Truman, working on the Marshal 
Plan and NATO, and serving as Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Affairs during the Korean War. He was now 
the President of the Rockefeller Foundation. Despite 
Bowles' greater affinity with Kennedy's views on the 
underdeveloped world, he was rejected for Rusk because of 
his lack of experience in European affairs. 18 This was to 
prove to be a serious blow to Kennedy's African policy. 
Bowles wished to implement a dramatic shift in foreign 
policy as outlined by Kennedy in his campaign--by 
~ 
reorganizing the State Department to give greater policy-
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making powers to the geographic bureaus. Rusk, on the other 
hand, was a Europeanist and decidedly unsympathetic to the 
policy of tolerating neutralism. (Bowles remembers his 
horror at a conversation concerning neutralists in the UN in 
which Rusk said, "It is high time that they decided what 
side of the cold war they are on.,,)19 
Bowles was given the undersecretariat, but was 
flanked by Rusk's men at the Bureaus of Economic Affairs 
(headed by George Ball) and Political Affairs (headed by 
George McGhee, a conservative Democrat who had served as 
Eisenhower's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs). 
Once installed, conflict between Rusk and Bowles 
began. Bowles brought new faces into State and wrote memos 
on reorganizing the State Department, and frequently went 
over Rusk's head to Kennedy with suggestions. Rusk resented 
being passed over, disagreed with Bowles' assessments on 
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reorganizing the State Department, and distrusted the 
liberals Bowles was inviting into the Department. After the 
Bay of Pigs fiasco, Rusk sought to take the heat off himself 
by leaking rumors of their disagreements to the press. 
Bowles was unfairly kept in the dark about his status until 
November 1961, when Kennedy announced the shake-up known as 
the "Thursday Night Massacre." Chester Bowles was removed 
from his post as Undersecretary and was appointed the 
President's Special Representative and Advisor on African, 
~ 
Asian, and Latin American Affairs, a position with perks 
(higher salary and ambassadorial status) but no power. 
Bowles was replaced by George Ball. McGhee replaced Ball, 
and Walt Rostow came over to become the Assistant Secretary 
for an expanded Policy Planning Office. 20 The shake-up 
signaled the triumph of the Rusk-Acheson forces over the 
Bowles-Stevenson group. Williams at the African Bureau lost 
in Bowles his major ally in the Department of State. 
However, Williams still had the support of Kennedy and had 
attracted the attention of everyone with the way he took 
charge of the African Bureau and inspired his staff. 
The implementation by the Kennedy administration of 
the new posture toward neutralism began immediately. 
Overtures were made to prominent leaders of the non-aligned 
movement, such as Nehru and Nasser. Kennedy also took a 
strong early position against apartheid in Rhodesia and 
South Africa, which indicated to African neutralists that a 
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real change in American policy may have been occurring. 
The one nation in Africa that seemed most unlikely 
to accept this new American president was the former French 
colony of Guinea. At the time Kennedy took office, 
relations were extremely tense. Guinean President Sekou 
Toure accused him of complicity in Patrice Lumumba's death 
(despite the fact that he had been killed two days before 
Kennedy's inauguration), and in April Toure accepted the 
Lenin Peace Prize. Still Kennedy continued to regard Toure 
~ 
(whom he had met in 1959) as an independent nationalist. He 
chose William Attwood, ex-reporter for Look and one of the 
stevenson people recruited by Bowles, for the position of 
Ambassador to Guinea. 21 Attwood was young and energetic and 
impressed Toure with his shirt-sleeve style. Attwood 
reported back on the confused Russian aid program, which he 
called "Malice in Blunderland" and the numerous Russian faux 
pas. Sensing an opportunity to capitalize on Soviet 
mistakes, Attwood urged an aid program to show American 
faith. Philip Habib was sent by AID to help put together a 
small aid program (about $25 million), which they submitted 
in May 1961 where it immediately became stalled in 
bureaucracy. Attwood and Habib flew to Washington and 
began personally to lobby key individuals, particularly 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had just returned from 
visiting Africa and was immediately sold on the plan. After 
a talk with the president the plan began to move through the 
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bureaucracy. 22 
The rapprochement bore fruit when in November 1961 
Toure expelled Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod, claiming that 
he was involved in a plot against Toure. He also purged 
from his Party members he felt were too pro-Soviet. A visit 
by Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan did not heal the wound--
Toure refused to see him. 23 
Attwood exploited the Soviet/Guinea tensions to 
improve the Guinea rapprochement with the West. In 1962, 
~ 
the promised aid arrived and relations began to warm 
considerably. In October, Toure met Kennedy at the While 
House and was impressed by his hospitality, quite in 
contrast to the cool reception he had received in 1959. 
During the Cuban missile crisis, Toure refused to allow 
Soviet planes to refuel in the Soviet-developed airport at 
Conakry. When Attwood returned to Washington in 1963, he 
was able to report Toure had given him a warm send off, at 
which he had said: 
Every African leader guided by a conscience must 
recognize now the value cooperation with the United 
States and that American assistance is, contrary to what 
we are told, the most disinterested, the m~~t effective 
and the most responsive to our real needs. 
The policy statements of Kennedy and his 
administration, the selection of G. Mennen Williams to head 
the African Bureau, and the initial reports of Bill 
Attwood's tour in Guinea were all signs that American policy 
was moving toward tolerance of neutralism. However, the 
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selection of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State and the later 
demotion of Chester Bowles suggested the limits of change in 
foreign policy still defined by the cold war. These 
conflicting forces of change and inertia would shape the 
debate over the new policy in its first major test: The 
decision whether or not to assist in the Ghanaian Volta Dam 
project. 
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CHAPTER V 
KWAME NKRUMAH AND GHANA'S 
INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE 
Because of its relatively early independence, its 
political sophistication a~d the dynamism of its leadership, 
by 1961 Ghana was Africa's premier nation-state in the eyes 
of the international community. President Kwame Nkrumah 
and many of his advisors qpd been educated abroad, had 
participated in the international anti-colonial and pan-
Africanist movements, and in general were an outward looking 
group. By the time John F. Kennedy took office, most of the 
international community of Africa and Asia knew of 
the Ghanaian government's Volta Dam project and of the 
Eisenhower administration's reluctance to support it. They 
were also aware of President John F. Kennedy's pledge to 
tolerate neutralism and to not tie strings on American 
assistance in the economic development of Africa. 
It soon became apparent that the question of whether 
or not the United States would support and assist in the 
Volta Dam project would be a litmus test on Kennedy's policy 
toward African neutralism. If he assisted the project, 
despite the avowed neutralism of Ghanaian foreign policy, it 
would be a positive step forward for U.S. policy--a step 
which many believed would erase some of the ground grained 
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by Soviet policy over the last five years. However, if 
Kennedy let ideological and foreign policy differences with 
Ghana get in the way of American assistance, then the loss 
to American prestige and goodwill in Africa could be 
irreparable. 
To understand the dynamics of Ghana's foreign policy 
and the political view of its leadership, one has to 
understand the history of Ghana's independence struggle. 
While John F. Kennedy was organizing his fellow war veterans , 
for a campaign for the U.S. Congress, Kwame Nkrumah was 
planning boycotts and strikes against the British colonial 
government, and spending time in colonial prisons. Just as 
Kennedy's generation was shaped by World War II and the New 
Deal, Nkrumah's was molded by the anti-colonial struggle and 
dreams of pan-African unity. 
The World War that launched John F. Kennedy's career 
set into motion forces that would soon lead to the end of 
the European colonial empires and the emergence of an 
independent Asia and Africa. The process began in 1947, 
when war-wearied Britain gave in to the Indian peoples' 
demand for independence. India's attainment of independence 
through peaceful means had a significant impact on Britain's 
African colonies. Africa nationalists saw an example in the 
use of Gandhian nonviolence, and they perceived that the 
British imperial idea was in its decline and that the 
British colonial policies were beginning to take into 
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account the eventual dissolution of the Empire. Of all the 
African colonies, the Gold Coast (Ghana), by way of its 
economic, educational, as well as political advancement, was 
the most prepared to take advantage of the opportunity the 
Indian example presented. 
Since 1918, when Gold Coast attorney J. E. Casely 
Hayford founded the National Congress of British West 
Africa, the colony had been a center of anti-colonial 
organization. During the 1920s and 1930s nationalist 
~ 
sentiment was expressed through the West African Student's 
Union and the Pan-African congresses organized by the 
American W. E. B. Dubois. In 1935 Nigerian Nnamdi Azikiwe 
arranged to have eight Nigerian and four Gold Coast students 
sent to America for further education. 1 
Among those students was Kwame Nkrumah, son of an 
Nzima goldsmith, educated at a Roman Catholic mission and 
the prestigious Achimota secondary school. Nkrumah enrolled 
at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, where he remained 
until 1945, obtaining advanced degrees in theology, 
education, and philosophy. While in the United States, 
Nkrumah also taught, but most of his time was taken up with 
political activities. 2 
Nkrumah left America in 1945 for London to join in 
the preparation of the Fifth Pan-African Congress to be held 
in Manchester. He was elected general secretary of the West 
African National Secretariat established by the congress, 
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and became the editor of its organ, the New African. In 
1947 Nkrumah was offered the position of party general 
secretary by Dr. Joseph B. Danquah, leader of the recently 
founded United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). The UGCC was a 
small conservative party of barristers, merchants, farmers, 
and chiefs, and its leaders wanted Nkrumah to build a mass 
party. Nkrumah returned home in December 1947, resolved to 
do just that; however he had no intention of turning this 
mass movement over to the conservative UGCC. 3 
~ 
In early 1948, Nkrumah and five other UGCC officials 
were arrested for alleged complicity in February riots by 
ex-servicemen and were detained at Kumasi. Meanwhile, 
Governor Sir Gerald Creasy established a commission to 
investigate the riots and the UGCC. The Commission 
recommended that a new constitution should be drawn up with 
the aid of moderate African leaders. 4 After his release, 
Nkrumah founded the Accra Evening News as the organ of a 
radical vanguard within the UGCC, which soon relieved him of 
his position as general secretary.5 Nkrumah then split with 
the UGCC, founded the Convention People's Party, and 
captured most of the UGCC rank and file membership. 
The Cpp's program called for immediate self-
government to be attained by "legitimate political 
agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns and as a last 
resort the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, 
and noncooperation based on the principle of absolute 
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nonviolence. ,,6 
Meanwhile, that year the commission of Britons and 
Africans (most drawn from the UGCC) released the new 
constitution, which was immediately implemented by the new 
Governor Charles Arden-Clarke. It called for a directly 
elected all-African Legislative Assembly, an Executive 
Council with eight African ministers from the Assembly, and 
three ministers appointed by the Governor, who also retained 
all defense and external powers. The CPP denounced the new 
i 
constitution as a subterfuge and began a campaign of 
"Positive Action" to force the British to accede to 
immediate self government. Strikes and boycotts were called 
and the Government responded by arresting and convicting 
Nkrumah and other CPP leaders of incitement, libel, and 
sedition. K. A. Gbedemah, the CPP general secretary, kept 
the movement alive, and the CPP won a majority of seats in 
the February 1951 election of the Legislative Assembly. 
Arden-Clarke released Nkrumah and asked him to form a 
"government. ,,7 
For the next six years, Nkrumah and Arden-Clarke 
would cooperate to achieve a peaceful and orderly transition 
to independence. As Prime Minister of a self-governing 
British colony Nkrumah could exert real power on the 
domestic level, while in international affairs he was 
restrained by the fact that Britain retained all official 
defense and foreign policy powers and that the Gold Coast 
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was not a sovereign state. Thus restrained, Nkrumah plunged 
into establishing the supremacy of the CPP, Africanizing the 
civil service, and planning the economic development of his 
nation. The CPP built an impressive machine, garnering 
large majorities in the 1954 and 1956 elections. Nkrumah's 
five-year plan was implemented. One of the major parts of 
the plan was the Volta River project, an old British plan to 
develop the hydroelectric potential of the Volta River to 
aid the processing of bauxite mined nearby. The CPP had 
i 
embraced the project as a campaign promise in the 1951 
election, and it was the foundation of its program of 
industrialization. 8 
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ORIGINS OF GHANAIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
The lack of external powers did not keep Nkrumah 
from planning for Ghana's post-independence diplomacy, or 
from forming the nucleus of a foreign policy establishment. 
In June 1954, Nkrumah created the Governor's Advisory 
Committee on Defense Powers (GACDP) to assist in the 
preparation of foreign policy machinery for Ghana's eventual 
~ 
entry into international politics. The members were chosen 
from the nationalist elite which made up the inner circle of 
CPP power. K. A. Gbedemah, the businessman who had led the 
party to victory in the 1951 elections while Nkrumah was 
jailed, was now an extremely competent minister of finance 
(1954-1961), the Colonial Office's advisor to the British UN 
mission, and a strong proponent of attracting foreign 
investment and the development of the Volta Dam project. 
Kojo Botsio had wide experience in the Pan-African movement 
of the 1930s and 1940s, and was to represent the Gold Coast 
in 1955 at the Bandung conference of Asian and African 
Peoples. Like Gbedemah, he was prominent in business, and 
his wife was "one of the most important traders in Ghana." 
In contrast, Ako Adjei was a Marxist, the "most radical (and 
least influential) of the inner elite," who played a part in 
Nkrumah's appointment as UGCC secretary-general in 1947. He 
acted as a roving ambassador on various missions until his 
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appointment as foreign minister in 1959. 1 
One of the first actions of the GACDP was to 
establish a foreign service drawn from the senior levels of 
the civil service. Most prominent of these men were F. S. 
Arkhurst (minister to the UN, 1957-62 and Principal 
Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1962-1965); A. L. 
Adu (Principal Secretary, MFA, 1957-1959); F. E. Boaten 
(first minister to the USSR, 1960-1961); and Alexander 
Quaison-Sa-ckey (Ambassador to the UN, 1959-65; President of 
19th Session of the UN Gederal Assembly; Foreign Minister, 
1965-1966). They were sent to London for training at the 
British Foreign Office, and later on to British missions 
around the world to gain practical experience. This British 
training would always make the group questionable in the 
eyes of their radical rivals. 2 
In addition to GACDP and the foreign service, 
Nkrumah's various expatriate advisors influenced early 
Ghanaian policy. Preeminant among them was the West Indian 
journalist, George Padmore. Padmore had been one of the 
major figures in the organized Pan-African movement since 
the nineteen twenties. He first met Nkrumah in 1945 in 
London, and the two men worked closely to prepare for the 
Fifth Pan-African Congress and later within the West African 
Secretariat. After coming to power, Nkrumah invited Padmore 
to the Gold coast where he immediately began to exert a 
powerful role on foreign affairs. To Padmore, Ghana was 
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merely a stepping-stone to the greater goal of a unified 
African continent. This idea became a major aspect of 
Ghanaian policy. Another area where Padmore's influence was 
evident was in the Ghanaian confidence in conference 
diplomacy. The organizational expertise that Nkrumah and 
Padmore brought to this form of diplomacy from their 
experience in the Pan-African Congress movement gave Ghana 
exaggerated power in African affairs. 3 
A very different foreign advisor was the Australian 
~ 
Sir Robert Jackson. Once an assistant secretary-general of 
the UN, Jackson had given advice to the Indian and Pakistan 
governments, before he was invited to the Gold Coast in 1953 
to study the Volta River Project. His report of 1956 
confirmed the feasibility of the project, and he served from 
then until 1961 as chairman of the development commission 
charged with drawing up a plan acceptable to foreign 
investors. Jackson and his wife, Barbara Ward (a prominent 
American development economist who was a friend of Kennedy 
and many of his academic advisors) played a restraining role 
and served as a bridge between Nkrumah and the Kennedy 
administration. Their influence was mainly directed at 
convincing Nkrumah that it was in Ghana's best interest to 
maintain the good relations with the West that were vital to 
the attraction of private investment in the Volta River 
project and other programs. 4 
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The most important policymaker was Nkrumah himself. 
A complex man, he has been often maligned and subject to 
pseudo-psychological analysis by the westerners who have 
written about him. Until 1988, there was no scholarly 
biography of Nkrumah based on archival, as opposed to 
anecdotal, sources. 
Among his critics, Henry L. Bretton describes 
Nkrumah as an intellectually average man, easily manipulated 
and flattered by his leftist expatriate advisors, whose 
~ 
earlier Pan-African militancy "gradually deteriorated into a 
form of escape exhilarating and psychologically more 
rewarding than the drudgery of ever more disappointing 
experiences at home." He argues that after a 1962 attempt 
on his life, Nkrumah became superstitious and obsessed with 
security. 5 
W. Scott Thompson sees Nkrumah's years in America as 
being crucial in his development of the "Wilsonian strand of 
utopianism" characteristic in Nkrumah's "obsession" with 
African unity. Thompson describes a love-hate relationship 
between Nkrumah and the West, reflected in his use of 
western advisors and his deference to the Queen. "Royal 
favor, or gestures from the White House, easily influenced 
Nkrumah, because of his awe for the very Western power power 
he wished to displace.,,6 
Nkrumah's biographer David Rooney has perhaps the 
most balanced view of Nkrumah. Nkrumah is portrayed as a 
visionary who "almost alone among African leaders, saw the 
continent's future in a global perspective." The Marxist 
analysis he absorbed in the United States led him toward a 
vision of a "united and self-sufficient Africa." Rooney 
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writes: "Through the Volta river project,he set out to make 
Ghana the industrial base for the whole of Africa, and to 
save the continent from the debt creating intentions of the 
western world." 
Nkrumah failed in bringing about his vision, Rooney 
~ 
argues, because it was "a task too big for one man." His 
inability to conquer corruption and establish a stable 
regime in his own country made the realization of his 
continental ambitions impossible. Nkrumah "sawall the 
visions, dreamt all the dreams, and made all the mistakes." 
But Nkrumah's mistakes were almost inevitable, Rooney 
concludes, given the size of his dreams and an overwhelming 
legacy of colonialism, poverty, debt and dependency.7 
The most important aspect of Nkrumah's personality, 
most observers of Nkrumah believe, was what Robert Jackson 
called the "separate sealed compartments in his mind," which 
enabled him to satisfy both his western and Eastern suitors. 
This ability helped Nkrumah to play both cold war powers off 
in his attempts to obtain development aid for his country. 
As David Williams, the editor of West Africa and a close 
observer of Nkrumah, has noted: "Nkrumah was convinced he 
would have to be the perfect 'neo-colonialist' leader to get 
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Western investment. • • • And he had an image of exactly how 
he would have to behave to preserve their support." S 
In the Ghanaian foreign policy establishment, there 
were several strains which would later cause major disputes. 
There were ideological conflicts between the pro-Western 
officials, such as Gbedemah, and the more radical leftists 
over the relations with the West. In addition there were 
disputes between the militant pan-Africanist theorists and 
the young diplomats trained in more realistic policy 
~ 
concerns. Nevertheless, on the eve of independence there 
was a consensus on basic policy. It was a policy of 
vigorous pan-Africanist diplomacy and positive neutralism 
(with a subtle tilt toward the West), the initial objective 
of which was the acquisition of foreign investment for the 
Volta River project. It was a policy of many 
contradictions. Pan-Africanist doctrine was anti-colonial 
and anti-imperialist, calling for opposition to many 
American policies. Neutralism implied real non-alignment, 
and Nkrumah's Volta project could only be funded by massive 
Western aid. Still, Nkrumah was able, initially at least, 
to reconcile these contradictions because Western aid was 
vital to his immediate plans. 
68 
Endnotes 
1W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: 
Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1969), 17-20. 
2Ibid ., 19. 
3Ibid., 21-23. 
4Ibid ., 21. 
5Henry L. Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah 
~ 
(New York: Praeger, 1972), 29. 
6Thompson, 25. 
7David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in 
the Third World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 2. 
8Thompson, 27. 
CHAPTER VII 
GHANA AND THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, 
1957-1960 
Ghana's independence ceremonies were attended by 
representatives of nearly seventy nations; among them were 
those of the Unite States and the Soviet Union. On May 3, 
1957, Vice President Richard Nixon arrived and was greeted 
at the airport by Prime Minister Nkrumah and by thousands 
~ 
shouting "freedom! freedom!" and waving the new red, gold 
and green flag of Ghana. 1 The next day, Nixon met with 
Nkrumah and his foreign minister, A. L. Adu, at the American 
Consulate General for discussions which would set the tone 
for Ghanaian policy for the next three years. Both men had 
hidden agendas. Nkrumah wished to move the discussion from 
generalities to questions of the Volta Dam, while Nixon was 
concerned with Nkrumah's expressed policy of neutralism and 
wished to extract assurances that Ghana would not deviate 
from its western alignment. 
After explaining his country's efforts to diversify 
its economy, Nkrumah guided the conversation to the Volta 
River project, explaining the efforts to finance it. Nixon 
"listened sympathetically," but made no commitments, merely 
stating that it was a "matter for exploration" and then 
shifting the subject to desirability of private investment. 
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Nixon then turned to the subject of post-
independence Ghanaian foreign policy. He inquired whether 
he might refer to Ghana's policy as "nationalist," saying 
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that he disliked the term neutralism, since it implied moral 
neutrality and a lack of concern about preserving Ghana's 
independence. Nkrumah fell into Nixon's trap, stating that 
Ghana's policy "will be one of non-involvement and non-
alignment in the East-West struggle. 'But,' he said, 'Ghana 
can never be neutral.' It will jealously safeguard its 
~ 
independence and resist all efforts at domination.,,2 
Within the context, Nkrumah's remarks indicated that 
Ghana would be non-aligned, but Nixon informed the press 
afterward that Nkrumah had said that "Ghana will never be 
neutral" in the "cold war,,,3 a clear distortion. Nixon's 
report to the President on his return would not have pleased 
Nkrumah either. Nixon gave lukewarm support to the Volta 
scheme. Noting the cost of the project was "formidable," he 
suggested that America "follow closely the scheme with a 
view toward ascertaining whether it is a well-conceived and 
practical project, which we should support in the IBRD 
[World Bank] and perhaps aid to a limited extent 
ourselves. 114 
Little was accomplished in Washington on the 
project, and would not have if a waitress at the Howard 
Johnson's in Dover, Delaware had not reminded Africa that 
the United States was racially segregated by refusing to 
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serve Ghanaian Finance Minister K. A. Gbedemah a glass of 
orange juice. 
The well-reported incident sent the White House 
scurrying to control the damage, and Gbedemah was given the 
invitation to see the President that he had up to now been 
denied. Gbedemah was too clever to waste this opportunity 
to push the Volta project, and for Eisenhower this was 
apparently the first time he had heard of it. Afterwards, 
Carl Flescher of the International Cooperation Agency (ICA) 
~ 
was asked to work up a proposal before the mid-summer state 
visit of Prime Minister Nkrumah. 5 
Since the project had been first envisioned in 1900, 
numerous studies of the project had been made, the latest 
being the 700 page Jackson report, which estimated the cost 
at $900 million for a hydroelectric dam, a power plant, 
aluminum smelter, a railroad network, towns and a new port. 
Initially Alcan of Canada and British Aluminum had been 
interested but had reconsidered by the time of Ghana's 
independence. In mid 1957, an American entrepreneur, Fraser 
Leith, was given a ninety-day option to raise capital to 
finance the project. While Leith got nowhere, he did 
interest the Department of State enough for it to consult 
aluminum-industry executives. One of those consulted was 
Chad Calhoun, a vice president of Kaiser Industries and 
Edgar Kaiser's contact man in Washington. Calhoun was more 
concerned with obtaining a contract for his company's 
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construction division, but he hinted that Kaiser Industries 
might eventually help finance the project, providing they 
got the construction job. 6 
It was to Calhoun that Flescher now turned for 
advice. As he saw it the United State's role would be to 
lend the Ghanaians enough capital to build the dam and power 
station, while private investors would build the aluminum 
smelter. Flescher's problem was finding a company which was 
ambitious enough to risk the capital. By spring he 
~ 
concluded that only a consortium could handle the risk. In 
mid July, he asked Calhoun the cost of an engineering study 
of the project. Calhoun said that Kaiser could do it for 
$120,000. Flescher told State Department officials to 
arrange a meeting between Calhoun and Nkrumah during 
Nkrumah's upcoming visit to the United States. 7 
On July 23, Nkrumah arrived in America and was met 
by Nixon. Later that day he met with Eisenhower to discuss 
the Volta project, foreign aid, U.S. relations with Africa 
and the U.S. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. Seeing an 
issue with which he could ingratiate himself with 
Eisenhower, he supported the U.S. position on Lebanon 
wholeheartedly. 8 The next day, Nkrumah, finding off 
questions from the National Press Club, responded to the 
question of whether there was a "communist element in Ghana" 
by saying: "We in Ghana • • • do not allow the ideology to 
have any fruitful set-up in our country."g On racial 
discrimination in America, Nkrumah said that this problem 
has been "exaggerated deliberately by those who hoped to 
bring the country into disrepute.,,10 Later that day, 
Nkrumah addressed the Senate, calling for more American 
investment and aid for Africa. 
73 
The next day Nkrumah made a major speech before the 
Council on Foreign Relations, where he explained Ghana's 
non-alignment, which he said "could only be understood in 
the context of the cold war." He compared it to nineteenth 
~ 
century American policy of non-entanglement, and denied that 
it implied "indifference to the great issues of the day." 
He said that on the great issue of war and peace Ghana "puts 
all its weight behind the peaceful settlement of disputes" 
through the United Nations and that Ghana accepted "every 
provision of the UN Charter.,,11 
Nkrumah then appealed for foreign assistance for 
Africa, arguing that aid expanded trade, and that it was 
"the surest guarantee of permanent friendship between Africa 
and the west." He discussed what Kennedy associate Harlan 
Cleveland called the "revolution of rising expectations!" 
"The hopes and ambitions of the African people have been 
planted and brought to maturity by the impact of Western 
civilization," he said, but "it has forced the pattern upon 
us. • • • We can not tell our peoples that the material 
benefits and growth and modern progress are not for them. 
If we do, they will throw us out." Therefore, Nkrumah 
argued that Africa must modernize, either with western 
support or with the help from "elsewhere": "This is not a 
warning or a threat, but a straight statement of political 
reality.,,12 
On the 27th, as Nkrumah was preparing to leave for 
New York, the White House released the Eisenhower/Nkrumah 
74 
joint communique. In it the two governments first affirmed 
their bonds of friendship, then turned to the matter of the 
Volta project. The two governments "explored the types and 
~ 
scope of assistance which the United States Government might 
be able to extend." The United States "expressed 
appreciation of the contribution" of the project to Ghanaian 
development and "agreed to continue to explore with private 
American interests • • • how it might assist with loans if 
the private financing were pressured." However, the United 
States made no commitments. In other clauses, the 
governments agreed that U.S. troops should remain in Lebanon 
until they could be replaced by a UN peacekeeping force, 
they "exchanged views on the emergence of new African 
states" and the President "noted with deep interest • 
the development of a distinctive African personality, 
emphasized in this connection the sincere interests of the 
United states in the orderly political, economic and social 
advancement" of Africa. 13 
The following day Nkrumah appeared on the Meet the 
Press show on NBC. The first questions asked dealt with 
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neutralism and Lebanon, which Nkrumah answered by repeating 
statements made early in the trip. He was then asked if he 
thought the United States was imperialist. "That all 
depends on what you mean by imperialism," Nkrumah said, "but 
as far as I know, I don't think the United States is 
imperialist.,,14 Nkrumah later explained that although he 
believed in the Marxist "philosophy," he "never found it 
incompatible with private investment." Asked if he had 
"obtained ·any promises of help" relating to the Volta 
, 
project, he admitted he had not, "but the atmosphere is so 
congenial, I hope something may come out of it.,,15 
Nkrumah spent the rest of the trip publicizing 
Africa, Ghana, and the cocoa trade. He made a triumphful 
return to Lincoln University, rode a motorcade through 
Harlem crowds, lunched with New York Governor Averell 
Harriman, visited the New York Cocoa Exchange, the New York 
Stock Exchange, and various trade agencies. His travels 
were heavily covered by the mass circulation and black 
press. 16 
On August 1, Nkrumah had an unpublicized meeting 
with Edgar Kaiser at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, which 
perhaps was the most important of the entire tour. Earlier 
that week Nkrumah had met with Calhoun and agreed to split 
the cost of a Kaiser Industries engineering survey of the 
Volta project. The purpose of meeting was to allow Kaiser 
to make his own assessment of Nkrumah's personal stock. The 
meeting was a success. Kaiser decided that "Nkrumah was a 
man to be trusted" and Nkrumah sensed that things were 
finally moving on the project. He invited Kaiser to visit 
him in Ghana that September and urged him to begin the 
survey immediately.17 
Nkrumah returned to Ghana on August 8, without any 
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commitments from the United States but optimistic about the 
future of the Volta River project and U.S. relations 
in general. The Volta project had been put on the United 
~ 
states foreign policy agenda. It had been discussed in the 
New York Times and in the Council of Foreign Relations. 
From this point on few articles on Ghana would omit mention 
of it. Although the Republican administration had showed 
little interest, Democrats such as Adlai Stevenson, Senator 
John F. Kennedy, and New York Governor Averell Harriman 
became supporters of the project. 
In September, Kaiser made his trip to Ghana, and the 
engineering crews soon followed and began the survey. In 
February 1959, the report was released, and it envisioned a 
price of $300 million for the dam, power station, smelter, 
and a 500 mile transmission net, which would enable 60 per-
cent of the projects power to reach buyers. That March, 
Kaiser returned to Accra to discuss the report. Nkrumah 
gave Kaiser the contract to draw-up specific plans (his 
company ultimately won $25 million worth of construction 
contracts on the project) and urged him to invest in the 
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smelter. Kaiser declined because Alcan had recently began 
an attempt to form a consortium and he did not want to muddy 
the waters. However, by summer Alcan had made little 
progress. Kaiser "slowly reached the decisions. One was 
that if a consortium were to be formed, he was going to have 
to take the lead himself. The other was that, by one means 
or another, the U.S. Government had to back the Volta 
project.,,18 
In August, Kaiser received a call from Nathaniel 
i 
Davis, Alcan president, who told him that his company was 
giving up. Kaiser penned a memo to Calhoun "Nat called. 
We've got the ball." However, the ball did not seem to be 
moving anywhere. Calhoun found few sympathetic ears in the 
State Department. Kaiser was able to get representatives of 
Alcan, Alcoa, Olin Mathieson, and Reynolds to put up $50,000 
each to form a study group Volta Aluminum Co. (Valco), which 
later could be turned into a consortium. The formation of 
Valco convinced the Ghanaians to look for the money for the 
dam and the power plant. They asked the World Bank to 
assist them and, in January 1960, the bank sent officials to 
make a report of the costs. The report released in July 
1960 was not good news--it pronounced the $300 million cost 
estimate too low, and was skeptical about the ability of 
Ghana to sell enough power to make it feasible. At this 
point Kaiser decided to make a concerted effort to change 
the World Bank's mind. Discussions were opened and by the 
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end of 1960, "the bank was gradually converted to Kaiser's 
viewpoint." At this point Kaiser had raised interest in the 
North American aluminum firms and the World Bank. It was 
now the time for the Department of State to begin talking 
about financing the project. They did not. It was an 
election year and Eisenhower was content to serve out his 
term. Kaiser would have to wait until the next president 
took office. 19 
On July 3, the Belgium Congo became independent. 
~ 
Within two weeks, its army had mutinied, beginning a crisis 
which would last four years and irreversibly change the 
state of African affairs. The Congo Crisis inevitably 
effected the United States' relations with Ghana. 20 There 
were two major effects. First, it split Africa into 
moderate and radical blocs, thereby forcing Ghana to choose 
sides in the cold war or stand alone. Second, because the 
major U.S. policy objective in the Congo Crisis was to keep 
the radical Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and his 
associates out of power, and Nkrumah's objective was to keep 
him in power, there was an irresolvable conflict between the 
two nations. 
The ill will generated by increasingly conflicting 
views on the Congo came to a head at the 23rd session of the 
U.N. General Assembly. Before the Assembly met, Nkrumah 
conferred with Eisenhower for an hour, then with Premier 
Nikita S. Khrushchev, "apparently discussing only 
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generalities with each." In a joint statement, Nkrumah and 
Eisenhower affirmed their common loyalty to the United 
Nations. 21 However, the Eisenhower administration was 
surprised to hear Nkrumah harshly criticize Western policy 
on the Congo, call for an all-African command for the UN 
Congo Force, and urge the admission of the People's Republic 
of China into the UN. 
Nkrumah's remarks diverged sharply from current 
American foreign policy; none of them attacked, however, the 
I 
United States or supported specifically Soviet policies. 
Secretary of State Christian Herter reacted angrily at a 
meeting of the Foreign Policy Association later that day. 
"I think Nkrumah," he said, "marked himself as very 
definitely leaning toward the Soviet Bloc.,,22 The reaction 
by Ghana was immediate, but not so harsh as to preclude 
reconciliation. The remark by Herter was both unfair and 
undiplomatic. Despite his effort to win favor by moderating 
his rhetoric, Nkrumah had been labeled communist for a few 
honest disagreements with U.S. policy. Any disagreements 
should have been argued in camera rather than in the press. 
The narrowmindedness of Eisenhower's administration left 
United States-Ghanaian relations in shambles, despite a 
strong effort by Nkrumah to cultivate the American 
leadership. All was not lost, however, Nkrumah's message 
had been noted in other quarters. 
Endnotes 
1New York Times, 4 March 1957, 1:4. 
2National Security Council, "Report to the President 
on the Vice President's Visit to Africa," April 22, 1957, 
Tab B. 
3New York Times, 5 March 1957, 5:1. 
4National Security Council, 9. 
5phfllip Siekman, "Edgar Kaiser's Gamble in Africa," 
~ 
Fortune 64 (November 1961): 130-33. The ICA was the 
predecessor to the Agency for International Development. 
6Ibid., 133. 
7Ibid., 199. 
8Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (New York: Praeger, 
1961),135-50. 
9Ibid., 139. 
1 0Ibid., 140. 
11 Ibid., 142-43. 
12Ibid., 145. 
80 
13"Eisenhower-Nkrumah Joint Statement," New York Times, 
27 July 1958, 4:5. 
14"Ghana's Prime Minister Meets the Press," Africa 




18Ibid ., 200. 
19Ibid., 204-206. 
20See Chapter III. 
21 Kinsey, 114; Dana Adams Schmidt, "Nkrumah Divides 
Diplomatic Visits," New York Times, 23 September 1960, 
18:5-6. 
81 
22Kinsey, 114; "Herter and Nkrumah," The New Republic 
153 (October 3, 1960): 5. For the Ghanaian reaction, see 
"Herter and the African," Daily Graphic (Accra), 
i! 
26 September 1960. 
CHAPTER VIII 
KENNEDY, THE VOLTA DAM PROJECT AND THE UNITED STATES 
POLICY TOWARD NEUTRALISM IN PRACTICE 
On the even of John F. Kennedy's inauguration in 
January 1961, Ghana had some reason to suppose that a change 
in relations with the United States was forthcoming. During 
the campaign, Kennedy had criticized the Republicans for 
slighting Africa and treat'ing its nations as "pawns" in the 
cold war, and he had urged a "no-strings" aid policy. In 
September, Kennedy had sent Harriman (one of his top 
advisors) to Ghana "to find out what the United States can 
do for Ghana in the field of technical aid,,,2 and following 
the election he sent his brother Edward to join a Senate 
Foreign Relation Committee study mission which was passing 
through Ghana. 3 In addition, Kennedy was a friend of twenty 
years to Nkrumah's confident, Barbara Ward Jackson, who 
urged Kennedy to meet with Nkrumah, whom she considered an 
independent nationalist. "It is worth a risk and could 
possibly be a triumph" was her advice. 4 
Kennedy's inaugural address also gave Ghana reason 
for hope. It was published in full in the Evening News and 
favorably commented on a two-part editorial entitled "A Test 
of Sincerity," which praised the President's "cognizance of 
the cry for freedom in Africa, and the crying need for 
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assistance to defeat the incredible poverty and disease in 
the continent."S However, the editors warned that while 
Kennedy had made a "very good speech" in which his concern 
for Africa was evident, "it is by this very fact that his 
sincerity will be put to the severest test.,,6 Following 
Kennedy's inaugural, the United States began to get fairer 
coverage in the Ghanaian press, which up to then had been 
harshly critical. 7 
During the transitton period, Kennedy had asked 
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa G. Mennen Williams 
to prepare a report examining the Volta River project from 
the viewpoint of cold war strategy. The report, released 
January 30, warned that "a major battle in the cold war is 
being waged in Africa" and that "Ghana is a decisive battle 
field where the issue still hangs in the balance." If the 
West would not finance the Volta River project, there was a 
"real" risk that Ghana would "turn to the East.,,8 The 
report listed five "compelling" reasons for the United 
States' support: (1) The Volta plan had been a major 
objective of the Nkrumah government since 1951 and thus was 
well planned and sound. (2) If the Western aid was not 
forthcoming, Ghana would turn east. (3) Ghana was the 
leading African nation--if she was rebuffed, it would damage 
U.S. relations with all of Africa. (4) Ghana's positive 
neutralism was no different than India's, with whom America 
had major aid programs. (5) If the United States refused to 
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assist the Volta project, it would have the same effect as 
Eisenhower's withdrawal from the Aswan Dam project--it would 
polarize Africa, and increase Soviet influence in the 
region. 9 
One of the report's recommendations was to increase 
government guarantees to Valco investors: "it is most 
important that U.S. Government make its policy decisions as 
to broaden guarantees or direct loans or a combination of 
both.,,10 It was decided ~hat the standard ICA guarantee 
would not suffice. However, Valco negotiators discovered 
that an obscure clause in the Development Loan Fund Act 
allowed the Government to make effective guarantees. In 
February, the State Department put together a preliminary 
funding program. For the dam and power plant Ghana would 
provide $98 million, the UK $14 million, the World Bank $47 
million with the United States lending $37 million through 
the DLF and Export/Import Bank. For the Valco Smelter, the 
DLF would guarantee 90% of the $54 million provided by 
Kaiser and Reynolds (the two remaining members of Valco 
after the withdrawal of Alcan, Alcoa, and Olin Mathieson) 
and would lend Valco $96 million through the Ex-Im-Bank. 11 
In March, Nkrumah was scheduled to be in New York 
for a meeting of the the UN General Assembly. Kennedy took 
the occasion to invite him to the White House for talks and 
met him warmly at the airport, an extraordinary gesture 
considering that it was not a state visit. This was 
followed by a ninety-minute meeting in which Kennedy told 
Nkrumah of his commitment to the elimination of Portuguese 
colonialism and that he would soon approve the Volta 
funding. At a press conference of greetings following the 
talk, Kennedy emphasized America's revolutionary past and 
his commitment to end colonialism. 
Nkrumah strongly rejected a remark by a reporter 
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which implied he was a communist. He said that the reporter 
confused anti-colonialism with communism and borrowed from 
~ 
Kennedy's rhetoric by saying that "anti-colonialism was 
invented by the United States."12 The next day Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk distanced himself form the Eisenhower policy 
towards Ghana in response to a question referring to 
Christian A. Herter's remark about Ghana being in the Soviet 
camp. "We start from where we are," he replied, and 
characterized the Nkrumah talks with such adjectives as 
"fruitful," "profitable," "helpful," and "productive.,,13 
If it was "profitable for Rusk, it was doubly so for 
Nkrumah. On June 29, Kennedy wrote Nkrumah stating that 
"all major issues involved in negotiations" for United 
States financing were resolved, and that his representatives 
were now working to draft a final document of approval. 14 
While the letter did not give final approval, it implied 
that it was forthcoming. Confident, Nkrumah accepted a $45 
million bid for the construction of the dam from Impresit, 
the construction division of Fiat, and began preparations 
for a long planned visit to the Eastern bloc scheduled for 
mid-July and August. 15 
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The Kennedy administration was watching the incoming 
visit with apprehension, and before Kennedy sent his letter 
of June 29, he asked the State Department to examine the 
implications of the trip. The resulting report dated 
June 26 predicted that the visit "will probably usher in a 
period of even closer relations between Ghana and the Soviet 
Bloc" and -that it "may lead to an increased Bloc presence in 
~ 
Ghana." However, the report also emphasized that Nkrumah 
had resisted Soviet overtures to train Ghanaian army units 
and that the "army is free of Soviet influence." It 
cautioned against reading too much into similarities in 
Ghanaian and Soviet pronouncements since their foreign 
policies "tend to coincide" on many issues. "Nevertheless, 
Nkrumah acts independently with respect to specific policy 
objectives." The report points out areas where Ghana's 
policy diverges. Nkrumah's support of the UN and his 
support for "African solutions to African problems" all have 
the potential for conflict with Soviet policy. The 
conclusion of the report is that Nkrumah "will tolerate 
Soviet assistance and support only so long as it is not 
prejudicial to the interests of Ghana and Africa.,,16 
Although the Kennedy administration expected some 
sympathy between Ghana and Soviet rhetoric, they were 
surprised by its intensity. The "Iron Curtain tour resulted 
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in so apparently fervent an embrace of the communists as to 
raise new questions about the Volta Dam at just the moment 
when Abram Chayes [the State Department Legal Counsel] 
brought the agreement to the point of signature,,,17 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. writes. The trip immediately 
brought about a sentiment both inside and outside of the 
administration to back out of the plan. Public opinion and 
Congress were hostile,18 and after an attack on the United 
States by Nkrumah at the Belgrade conference of non-aligned 
~ 
nations, Robert F. Kennedy (who had just returned from a 
visit to Africa) wrote his brother: "We are limited to the 
amount of money we are going to spend in Africa and it would 
be better perhaps to spend it on our friends rather than 
those who have come out against us.,,19 Only Chayes, 
Undersecretary Bowles and Williams supported the project 
within State. On September 18, Kennedy held up approval and 
began to reassess the decision. 20 
Kennedy was apparently still convinced of the 
project's merit but wanted more time to decide. In early 
October, Kaiser and Calhoun returned from Ghana with renewed 
assurances from Nkrumah that there was no change in basic 
Ghanaian policy.21 On October 20, Kennedy announced he was 
sending Clarence Randall and Chayes to review the project. 
Randall, Eisenhower's former chief foreign economic advisor, 
and a businessman of unquestionably conservative 
credentials, pronounced the plan feasible and that Nkrumah 
was not a communist. A circular inquiry to African allies 
registered approval of the plan. 22 
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That November, British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan wrote Kennedy urging him to go ahead with the 
project. He did not believe Nkrumah was communist and felt 
that if Kennedy rejected the plan, it would show Africans 
that they could not have freedom to criticize the West if 
they wanted Western assistance, which was not the message he 
believed Kennedy wanted to
l
send. 23 
Meanwhile, the CIA was engaged in its own study of 
Ghana, which was finished on November 16. The CIA concluded 
that "we do not believe that President Nkrumah has decided 
to align himself completely with the Bloc." The report 
noted that while he believed "he can use the Bloc to further 
his objectives" he will "maintain a Western presence in 
Ghana to offset the Bloc and improve his prospects for 
aid.,,24 In regard to the Volta project the CIA reported 
that Nkrumah was beginning to have difficulties obtaining 
Western aid. "If this trend is aggravated by the West's 
refusal to honor what is in his view a commitment to finance 
the Volta River project," the report warned, "Nkrumah will 
almost certainly react violently and turn even more to the 
Bloc.,,25 
While the administration was carrying on its 
reassessment, it could not be oblivious to the debate 
outside it, in the Congress and press. In Congress the plan 
had few supporters, with the liberals opposing it on human 
rights' grounds, and the conservatives because they felt 
Ghana was a "new Cuba.,,26 Within the press, Time magazine 
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and U.S. News and World Report led those opposed, while the 
New York Times and the New Republic supported the project. 27 
Time magazine had been carrying an offensive against Ghana 
for years, the Volta project being merely the most recent 
target. The New Republic supported the project, but urged a 
more realistic assessment of what foreign aid can and can 
~ 
not do. 
Its purpose can be nothing more nor less than to 
forestall, over the long term, the establishment and 
consolidation of a monolithic Communist world.. It 
cannot be counted on to prevent the countries whose 
independence we help underwrite from deciding at any 
particular moment that it is in their national interest 
to side with the Communists on some international issue • 
• • • ~~ will not recruit camp-followers for "our 
view." 
At the December 5 meeting of the National Security 
Council the decision to sign the Volta agreement was 
made. 29 Despite the vigorous opposition of his brother, the 
support of the plan by Macmillan, Kaiser, Randall, Lady 
Jackson and the CIA, was too great to derail the project. 
According to Schlesinger, Kennedy's decision was based on 
the long-term effect on United States-Ghanaian relations. 
Until the Volta River project's conclusion in the mid-
seventies, it was assumed that it would be a continuing 
restraint on Ghana's radicalism. Finally, "his view was 
90 
that the final beneficiaries of the Volta Dam would not be 
the government of Kwame Nkrumah, but the people of Ghana.,,30 
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CONCLUSION 
The emergence of an independent neutralist Africa 
changed the dynamics of the cold war. The Eurocentric 
military-strategic orientation of both the United States and 
the Soviet Union's foreign policy had little relevance to 
the underdeveloped nations of Africa. African neutralists 
wanted the capital and technology to transform their nascent 
economies, not arms and ~ilitary treaties. A more 
political-economic approach was called for. 
However both the U.S. and the USSR had serious 
ideological impediments to such a policy. The Soviet Union 
believed that the new African nations were tainted with 
bourgeois nationalism, while the United States, under the 
leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower, considered neutralism to 
be tantamount to active support for their enemies. 
After the ascension to power of Khruschev, the 
Soviets began to reassess their policies and became the 
first superpower to discard an outdated doctrine that 
prevented a serious dialogue with neutralist Africa. With 
an approach that combined economic assistance with active 
support for African positions in the UN, the USSR 
constructed a policy that appealed to the economic and 
political needs of neutralist Africa. 
John F. Kennedy saw the policies of the Eisenhower 
administration as damaging to the U.S.'s stature in Africa 
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and determined that the only way to compete with the Soviet 
Union in Africa was to accept neutralism as a reality and to 
match the Soviets blow for blow in the areas of economic 
assistance and support for African independence. This was 
not a matter of liberalism or altruism, rather it was a 
cold, hard assessment of the political realities of world 
politics in the second half of the 20th century. 
Ghana was the preeminent neutralist African state. 
This status was derived partially from its role as the first 
I 
African nation to attain independence after the war, but was 
also due to the reputation of its charismatic leader Kwame 
Nkrumah. Nkrumah was respected across the continent as a 
spokesman for African unity and a theorist of African 
socialism, but he was also a pragmatist and sought economic 
assistance from both superpowers. Despite the cool 
relationship between Ghana and the United States that had 
developed during the Eisenhower years, Nkrumah genuinely 
desired good relations with America. 
Ghana became the test case for the Kennedy 
administration's new policy toward the neutralist states of 
Africa. In good part this was due to the symbolic 
importance of Ghana, but a number of other factors were also 
at play. Ghana was an English-speaking nation. Its history 
was well known to Kennedy's academic advisors, many of whom 
had personal ties to its leaders. Finally, Kennedy 
inherited an opportunity in the Volta River Dam project to 
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forge an important tie between neutralist Africa and 
American industry. 
His decision to support the project was a concrete 
manifestation of his administration's respect for neutralist 
Africa. For Kennedy's purposes, it mattered little whether 
the project failed or succeeded in its goals. The important 
thing was that America was now competing with the Soviet 
Union in the new playing field of third world opinion. 
The Volta Dam decision is more than 25 years past, 
i 
and reflecting back, its legacy is a mixed one. In the last 
two and a half decades, the United States and the 
international lending community have supported similar 
prestige public works projects in developing nations. These 
projects have contributed little to economic development and 
greatly to the third world's debt. The Volta Dam itself has 
never achieved all of its projected technical goals, much 
less its more ambitious goal of serving as the springboard 
toward the industrialization of Ghana and then all of 
Africa. The only clear winners were Philip Kaiser and the 
companies involved in the construction of the dam and 
smelter, who could not lose on a project backed by both the 
U.S. and the World Bank. 
However, it could be argued that the Kennedy 
decision did have its positive effects on the course of 
African history. Africa is still considered in cold war 
terms, but the official tolerance of non-alignment is no 
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longer a serious issue. Occasionally some ultraconservative 
group or congressman will attack African nations for their 
UN voting record, but even the most conservative 
administration finds the utility of ignoring a nation's 
foreign policy pronouncements, particularly when, as 
usually is the case, the country is indebted to U.S. banks 
and dependent on American goodwill for World Bank 
development funds. 
With some exceptions in southern Africa and the 
i 
Horn, Africa has for the most part escaped becoming the 
focus of major cold war conflicts and the full scale 
interventions of the kind that have plagued Latin America 
and Asia. This is in good part because Khruschev and 
Kennedy confined the bulk of their competition to the 
economic field and their successors have not been inclined 
to break the precedent. 
Also, the acceptance by the United States of 
independent foreign policies by states receiving assistance 
has allowed Africans to play a significant role in both 
African and global relations. African nations like Nigeria 
and Kenya, which have significant economic and cultural ties 
to the United States, have nevertheless played important 
roles in the isolation of South Africa, the promotion of 
arms control and the formulation of a new international 
economic order, despite American opposition to these 
policies. 
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Despite the elapse of twenty-five years, many of 
the issues discussed in this thesis are still relevant. The 
question of whether the United States should tolerate the 
independence of nations to whom it provides foreign 
assistance is as current as the 1980 decision to cut off aid 
to the socialist Sandinista government in Nicaragua. After 
eight years of embargo and covert war has resulted in a 
stalemate, it bears wondering whether a policy resembling 
Kennedy's Ghana policy may have succeeded where Ronald 
I 
Reagan and Oliver North's failed. 
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